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I. INTRODUCTION
the process determining the supply of money
and bank credits in Argentina since the banking reform of November 1957.
Two definitions of money are used: the traditional one including banks’
demand deposits and currency held by the nonbanking private sector, and
a broader definition which includes, in addition, banks’ savings and
time deposits. The quantity outstanding of ordinary loans granted by
banks to the public is used as the empirical counterpart of bank credit.– 1/
With the reform of 1957, the Argentinean monetary system took on
the characteristics of Anglo-American systems. In these systems, the
Central Bank can not control the stock of money directly but rather
controls it indirectly through the manipulation of policy instruments.
Thus the emphasis of the analysis is on the portfolio allocation decisions
of banks and the public.
The Argentine Central Banks is a
under direct control of the executive
It supplies high-powered money to the
operations: (a) purchase and sale of
government agency which operates
branch of the Federal government.
economy by means of the following
foreign moneys and gold;
~~ Research Associate, Economic Development Center, University of
Minnesota. I would like to acknowledge the Ford Foundation and the
Economic Development Center for providing support for the research
underlying this paper, In addition, I’d like to acknowledge Mathew
Shane and Craig Swan for the help and encouragement they provided. This
paper is developed from a dissertation completed at the University of
Minnesota in December 1972.
~/ I distinguish between ordinary loans and selective loans. The latter
are financed by banks with “conditionally free” reserves imposed by
the Central Bank to pursue selective credit policies.-2-
(b) acceptance of Federal government debt;~’ and (c) advances and redis-
counts to commercial banks..?/ Even though it can actually control the
3/ the Central Bank does not control the last two types of operations,–
4/ It is assumed throughout first source in a fixed-exchange rate system._
the paper that any undesirable effect which the foreign sector might have
on the supply of high-powered money can be offset by the Central Bank within
a given quarter, the time unit of the analysis.
The Central Bank, by manipulating monetary policy instruments, can
affect the terms under which banks sell their liabilities, the expansion
of banks’ earning assets and the composition of assets held by banks.
In the context of Argentina, the specific monetary policy instruments are:
(a) Reserve requirements on banks’ liabilities. These require-
ments differ in accordance with the type of bank deposits
and other liabilities, and with the region of the country
where the bank is located. Until May 1968 there were also
differences between average and marginal reserve require-
ments.
(b) “Conditionally free” reserve requirements on banks’
liabilities. Banks can utilize such reserves to purchase
assets established by the Central Bank (selective loans).
~/ The Central Bank Act of 1957 es~ablished some restrictions upon the
maximum amount of government assets which the Central Bank could
hold to finance the budget deficit.
~/ In Argentina the discount rate is not a policy instrument because
the Central Bank sets the amount and all the terms of bank borrowings.
~/ The Central Bank may not be able to pursue a monetary policy inde-
pendent of fiscal policies because of its tight dependence on the
executive branch of the Federal government.
~/ See Wilms (1971) for a discussion on the control of money in an
open economy with a fixed-exchange rate system.-3-
(c) Ceiling rates on interest rates paid on different classes of
deposit liabilities. Although the ceiling for time deposits
was removed in March 1960, there have been ceiling rates for
savings deposits since 1957. For demand deposits, the pro-
hibition against interest payments was established in 1946,
and has continued to the present.
(d) Ceiling rates on interest charged by banks on loans to the
nonbanking private sector.
(e) Control over banks’ purchases of government assets.
(f) Full control over banks’ borrowing from the Central Bank.
In the next section I present the analytic framework used to explain
1/ -fn the process determining the supply of money and bank credit.-
Section III, I present estimations of the structural equations and
analyze the portfolio allocation decisions of both the public and
banks. The explanation of the supply of money and bank credit that
follows from the theoretical framework and the empirical evidence is
analyzed in Section IV.
II. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
It is proposed that the process determining the nominal stocks
of money and bank credit in Anglo-American monetary systems revolves
around the portfolio allocation decisions of banks and the public and
their response to the changing policies of the monetary authority. It
is this approach which is used to develop a model of the Argentine
2/ monetary sector.-
~/ For a complete exposition of this framework see Barandiaran (1973).
~1 The main advantages of the approach I follow with respect to the
Brunner-Meltzerhypothesis are: (a) portfolio behavior of each sector
is not necessarily independent of the sector’s total liability;
(b) portfolio disequilibrium can be explicitly introduced; and (c)
the interrelationshipsamong asset markets are explicitly considered.
See A. Burger (1971) for an exposition of the Brunner-Meltzer
hypothesis.-4-
The ceteris paribus conditions utilized in the analysis relate to
the exact nature of each sector’s adjustments with respect to its portfolio
balance.~1 The length of the time period used is a main determinant of
the types of adjustments made by banks and the public to changing market
conditions and monetary policies. Since the effects of changing one
variable cannot be discerned immediately, the longer the length of the
time period employed, the greater the likelihood that the entire sequence
of effects will be completed. In the quarterly model presented in this
paper, it is assumed that banks and the public adjust their holdings of
high-powered money (currency and reserves), deposits and loans, but not
their holdings of other assets. Furthermore, feedback effects of the
“real” sector of the economy upon the “monetary” sector are not taken
into account. In David Fand’s terminology, the money supply concept
I use is a short-run one.
21 it should include a For the model to be consistent and complete,–
total-demand equation, a total-supply equation. and the equilibrium
condition, i.e., total-demand equal to total-supply, for each asset treated
endogenously. However, the relative importance of demand and supply
conditions in explaining the quantity outstanding and the rate of return
of each asset depends upon the institutional constraints which affect asset
markets. I maintain that the structure of each of the six asset markets
in the model is as follows:
(a) High-powered money. The quantity supplied is assumed to be fully
controlled by the Central Bank and its nominal interest rate set equal to
~/ Cf. D. Fand (1971).
~/ Cf. C. Christ (1971).-5-
zero. Total demand consists of the public’s demand for currency, banks’
demand for excess reserves and legal reserves. The role of total demand
is to determine whether there is equilibrium or disequilibrium in this
market.
(b) Demand deposits. The effective nominal rate is assumed to be
equal to the ceiling set by the Central Bank (zero in this case). Although
7
banks have certainly attempted to avoid this ceiling to increase deposits,
I assume that the quantity outstanding is determined by demand conditions *
given that ceiling.
(c) Savings deposits. As demand deposits, the effective nominal
rate is assumed to be equal to the ceiling set by the monetary authority
and the quantity determined by demand conditions given the ceiling rate.
(d) Time deposits. Banks’ supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic;
they set the rate at which they are willing to accept any amount of




rate set by banks.
loans. I assume a type of market structure in which
outstanding and the loan rate are determined by banks’
behavior. The basic ideas underlying such an assumption are that loans
are heterogeneous and that banks cannot fully exploit their market power
in order to behave as discriminant monopolists.~’ Banks set the rate at
which they are willing to lend, but since this rate is below the
~/ From the banks’ viewpoint there has been a limit to the rate they can
pay given by the regulated loan rate adjusted for the marginal reserve
requirement on time deposits. They consider this limit “too low” for
successful competition with other financial intermediaries.
~/ See D. Jaffee (1971) for a discussion of this idea in relation to the
U.S. loan market.-6-
would-be-equilibrium rate, the quantity outstanding is determined by
banks’ supply conditions.
(f) Selective loans. I assume that the quantity outstanding of this
type of loans is determined by the quantities of deposits. An identity
expresses this relationship. There is no explicit reference to the
interest rate on which the Central Bank sets a ceiling.
Interrelationshipsamong asset markets in the model result from two
types of constraints: the balance-sheet constraint for each of the two
sectors and the interdependenceof the two balance-sheet identities. The
former is introduced into the analysis by imposing restrictions on the
parametemof the portfolio behavior equations. The latter, which amounts
to an application of Walras’ law to asset markets, allows us to omit from
the model the equilibrium condition for high-powered money (H = C + ER + LR).
The two balance-sheet identities are:
(1) C+DD+SD-I-TD=OPL+ SPL+ZP for the public,
(2) OPL + ER = DD + SD + TD + Zb - LR - SPL for banks,
where:
c: actual quantity of currency held by the public;
Di),SD, TD: actual quantities of demand, savings and time deposits
respectively;
LR: required quantity of legal reserves;
ER: actual quantity of excess reserves;
Zb, Zp: residual (exogenous) components of banks’ and the public’s
balance sheets respectively.~/
The total liabilities of each sector are defined as:
~/ The stock of high-powered money H is equal to the sum of Zb and Zp.-7-
(3) M2 = OPL + SPL + Zp for the public,
(4) LC = DD -I- SD + TD + Zb - LR - SPL for banks
The assumptions about the asset markets allow us to consider the total
liabilities M2 and LC as given from the viewpoint of the corresponding
sector. The public’s portfolio behavior then refers to how the total
liability M2 is allocated among currency and the three types of deposits
and banks’ portfolio behavior to how their loanable capacity LC is
allocated between excess reserves (ER) and ordinary loans (OPL).
The specification of the demand equations for currency and deposits
are based on desired or long-run demand relationships and a complete
partial adjustment mechanism. The long-run demands are functions of
the total liability M2, the expected net nominal rates of return of
deposits, and other variables that cause changes in the public’s pre-
ferences among the four assets.
The expected net nominal rate of return of deposits Ri is defined as:
(5) Ri = Ii + Ni - (bi*mi) for i = D, S, T,
where:
Ii: the contractual interest rate;
Ni: any other expected return per peso of deposits;
bi: average cost per market transaction; and
mi: number of market transactions per period.
Returns of bank deposits depend upon the controls on interest rates (the
I’s) payable by banks and upon the attempts by banks to avoid these
controls (the N’s). Banks are prohibited from paying any interest on-8-
demand deposits (ID = O) and there is a maximum rate on savings deposits.
Even though the controls on interest rates on time deposits were removed
in 1960, there still exist a limit to the rate that banks would be willing
to pay. In order to circumvent these ceilings, banks offer additional
returns such as rendering services to depositors without charge and in
proportion to the size of the account, giving pecuniary benefits in the
form of gifts, and granting loans (in a rationed market) if they are
accompanied by compensating balances. In addition, the R’s depend upon
the transaction costs associated with deposits. These costs include any
service charge per transaction, but more importantly, they include the
time involved in each transaction and further depend upon the number of
transactions in the period. To increase depositors’ net returns banks
have also reduced the transaction costs by offering free checking and by
establishing a pletora of conveniently located branches.
Since only a very small number of assets is explicitly considered,
the public’s preferences among them for given values of the total
liability M2 and the R’s may change as a result of changes in other
economic magnitudes not explained by the model. Three additional variables
that may produce these allocative effects on the asset composition of M2
are the public’s wealth (Wp), the expected rate of inflation (ERI) as a
proxy for nominal rates of returnof other assets, and the volume of
transactions in the economy (GDP).
For the balance-sheet identity to be satisfied at all point in
time, the partial adjustment mechanism must be complete.~/ Thus, the
~/ See W. Brainard and J, Tobin (1968) and C. Swan (1970).-9-
instantaneousresponse to a discrepancy between desired and actual
holdings of every asset is only partial and depends on the current
discrepancy in the holdings of all the four assets.
Therefore, the portfolio behavior of the public is described by







(6) . B*[M2, RD) Rs~ ~> wP~ ERI, GDP] t + (I-A).
SD SD
TD t TD t-l
/
where B is a 4x7 matrix of short-run coefficients,~is the 4x4 matrix
of adjustment coefficients and I is a 4x4 unit diagonal matrix. The
balance-sheet identity implies the following restrictions on the matrices
Band~:
4
~ bi,~= 1 and ~ bi,j = O
i=1 i=1
for j 2,3,...,7;
~ i,j = 1 for all j 1,2,3,...,7
i=1
In relation to banks’ portfolio behavior I maintain that the
anticipated or expected value, rather than the current value, of their
loanable capacity is the relevant magnitude. This assumption is based
upon the fact that in Argentina the main source of bank liquidity is
anticipated cash inflows from deposits. Given banks’ concern for their
~/ It is assumed that the long-run demands are linear functions of the
explanatory variables.-1o-
liquidity position, the choice between excess reserves and ordinary loans
is meaningful only in relation to anticipated loanable capacity (ALC).




Banks’ allocation of anticipated loanable capacity ALC depends upon
marginal return and marginal cost of holding loans instead of reserves.
marginal return of loans are assumed to be determined by the effective
loan rate (rL), the risk associated with the loan portfolio (Ldr) and the
degree of loan demand pressure on banks’ Ioanable capacity (Ldp). The
latter two determinants are a consequence of non-price rationing in the
1/ In turn, the marginal cost of holding loans is determined loan market.-
by the cost of liquidity sources alternative to excess reserves (Cliq) s
the anticipated participation of demand deposits in loanable capacity
(ADD) and the cost of failing to meet the reserve requirement test (pR).
Thus, banks’ behavior is summarized in the following equations:






= C“[ALC, C1iq, ADD, pR, rL, Ldr, ‘dP\t +
l ULCt
ER t 1
~/ In the absence of price rationing, some other aspects of the loan
or the loan customer has to be used by banks as their rationing
criterion. Two aspects of loans are generally considered for this
purpose; the risk of partial or complete default on the loan and
the length and value of the customer relationship; see D. Jaffee
(1971) and D. Hodgman (1963). The two variables mentioned in the
text are related to these two aspects.-11-
The first term on the right-hand side of the system of two equations (8)
explains the allocation of anticipated loanable capacity. Because of the
balance-sheet identity, the coefficients of the 2x6 matrix C must satisfy
these restrictions:
2 .—
~ Ci,l=l and #lci, j=o for j 2,3,...,6
i=1
Since series of the effective loan rate and of the interest rate
on time deposits are not available, I must omit the two equations explaining
banks’ behavior with respect to these rates from our estimated model.
I proceed as if these two rates did not respond to changes in the con-
ditions underlying banks’ behavior,
In addition to the six behavioral equations (6) and (8) and to the
three definitions (3), (4) and (7), the model includes the following two
identities explaining the quantities of legal reserves (LR) and selective
loans (SPL):
(9) LR= kl + (l-f)hl DD + k2 + (1-f)h2 SD +k3 + (1-f)h3 TD +XLR
(lo) SPL = (f”hl)DD+ (f*h2)SD+ (f*h3)TD+XSPL
where:
kl, k2, k3: average “frozen” reserve requirement on DD, SD, and TD
respectively;
hl, h2, h3: average “conditionally free” reserve requirement on DD, SD,
and TD respectively;
f: average proportion of “conditionally free” funds available
to lend to the private sector that is actually used.
XLR: exogenous (residual) component of legal reserves; and
XSPL: exogenous (residual) component of selective private loans.-12-
The model also includes the definitions of ALC, ADD and Ml. The definitions
of the anticipated values of loanable capacity and demand deposits are
derived from the adaptive expectations hypothesis.!-i and can be written as:
(11) ALCt = b*LCt + (l-b) (1 gL,t-l)ALCt..l
(12) ADDt = b*DDt + (l-b) (1 gD,t.l)ADDt-l
where:
b: the expectation parameter;
gL,t-1: the expected nominal rate of growth of LC in t at t-1;
gD,t-1: the expected nominal rate of growth of DD in t at t-1.
Finally, the definition of Ml is
(13) Ml =M2-SD-TD
Thus, the model consists of the fourteen equation (3), (4), (6),
(7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13). They jointly determine the
values of currency (C), demand, savings and time deposits (DD, SD and TD),
legal and excess reserves (LR and ER), ordinary and selective loans
(OPL and SPL), the two monetary aggregates (Ml and M2), current, anticipated
and unexpected loanable capacity (LC, ALC and ULC) and anticipated demand
deposits (ADD).
III. ESTIMATION OF THE PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOR EQUATIONS
In this section I present estimations of the portfolio behavior
equations of the public and banks. To estimate the two sets of structural
~/ The trend of the series are taken into account by incorporatingthe
rates of growth (the g’s).-13-
equations (6) and (8), which are overidentified, I use the method of two-
1/ The constraints on the parameters of these stage-least-squares (2SLS).-
equations that result from the balance-sheet identities are exactly
2/ satisfied by 2SLS estimates.-
In the estimation I assume that the portfolio behavior equations,
in addition to being linear functions, are homogeneous of degree one in




expressed in terms of ratios are multiplied by a nominal
(permanent income PY in the case of the public’s behavior
and anticipated loanable capacity ALC in the case of banks’
equations). Furthermore, I deflate nominal magnitudes by a wholesale
price index to avoid possible heteroskedasticityproblems due to the
inflationary conditions in Argentina.
2SLS estimates of the public’s and banks’ portfolio behavior
equations are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The specificationsused in these
two tables are the result of experimentingwith several alternatives.
In relation to the theoretical specifications discussed in Section 2,
the main omissions in Tables 1 and 2 refer to some components of the
rates of return on deposits, to the effective loan rate and to banks’
cost of failing to meet the reserve requirement test. All these omissions
are due to the lack of appropriate series.
~/ The problem posed by the two nonlinear elements ERIxALC/P and A/Dx
ALC/P is solved by approximating these variables using a Taylor expansion
series evaluated at mean values. The exogenous variables XLR/P and
XSPL/P were not included in the first stage because of the lack of
appropriate series.
&/ See Barandiaran (1973, p. 63).-14-
Table 1
Demand for Currency and Deposits: Two-Stage Least-
Squares Estimates, 1960 I - 1970 IV
DEPENDENT VARIABLES




































































































SY“x 1.398 1.214 0.620 0.626-15-
1 report parameter estimates and their t-values and the standard
error of estimate (SY”X). An asterisk (~~) on a parameter estimate
indicate that it is significant in a one tail-test at the 10 per cent
level, two asterisks (~~*) at the 5 per cent level. The standard errors
of estimate are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
The Public’s Portfolio Behavior. The theoretical explanation of
this behavior was based on three types of variables: (a) the total
liability or balance-sheet constraint M2; (b) the expected nominal net
rates of return of deposits; and (c) other variables affecting the public’s
preferences among the four assets. The estimates in Table 1 for the
total liability M2 indicate that in the short-run, that is, within a
quarter, an increase in M2 is allocated mainly to currency and demand
deposits. However, the estimates of the long-run coefficients that can






Thus, currency is playing the role of a buffer stock in the short-run
with respect to savings deposits, The very low proportion of time
deposit~ both in the short- and in the long-run, can be explained by
~/ The long-run coefficients for the structural equations are calculated
by multiplying the inverse of the matrix by matrix B in equation (6).-16-
bank’s inability to compete with other financial intermediariesoffering
a similar type of asset but with higher return for depositors. This
situation has been typical for the last twenty-five years.
In specification (5) of the rate of return of deposits Ri, only the
interest rates are readily associated with observable magnitudes. The
additional monetary returns given by banks to depositors (the N’s) require




these returns in inappropriate aggregate measure. Our
construct these measures implies a serious omission, at
case of demand deposits, for the empirical evidence on our
explanation of the public’s portfolio behavior. Furthermore, the avail-
able series on the rate on time deposits (IT) is that paid by a government
bank, which hardly responds to market forces.~’
The estimates for the interest rate on savings deposits (1S) show
a substitution effect between savings deposits and currency. This effect
persists and gets substantially larger in the long-run. The estimates
for IT show a substitution effect between demand and savings deposits on
one hand and time deposits on the other, even though the level of signifi-
cance of these esttiates is lower than in the case of 1S. This relationship
also persists in the long-run and the size of the effects increases. The
complementarily effect of IT on currency, which is nonsignificant, implies
a decrease in the sum of the three types of deposits when IT increases.
~/ Because of the poor quality of this series on IT, I did not estimate
the supply function of time deposits.-17-
Some costs of transaction, the remaining component
be functionally related to other observable magnitudes.
use a proxy variable for the number of transactions per
of the R’s, can
However, I only
period for demand
1/ This proxy variable is the turnover rate of demand deposits (~).–
deposits (DDV) which measures the degree of utilization of the inventories
of demand deposits and can be assumed to be positively related to the
number of transactions mD. The estimates of DDVXPY for currency and
demand deposits are significant and of the expected sign in both cases;
since DDVXPY represents a cost of holding inventories of demand deposits,
increases in DDVXPY decreases the quantity demanded of DD and increases
that of C.
The last set of
public’s preferences
explanatory variables includes those affecting the
among the four assets. Three variables are con-
sidered. Permanent income PY, used as a proxy for the public’s wealth
Wp, is not included in Table 1 since it has been nonsignificant in all
the regressions performed. The volume of transactions in the economy is
approximated by gross domestic product GDP. The estimate in Table 1 show
that the relative demand for money in a narrow sense (currency plus
demand deposits) increases with the volume of transactions. In the
short-run, the effect is primarily on demand deposits; in the long-run,
it is on currency. Finally, the allocative effect of the expected rate
of inflation ERI implies a shift from demand and time deposits to
~/ I used the variable “number of banks per inhabitant”,which I assumed
was a determinant of the cost per transaction, in preliminary regressions
but it appeared with signs different from those expected.-18-
currency and savings deposits when ERI increases. The long-run effect
is similar, except that the shift is almost entirely from time deposits
to currency. Under conditions of high and varying rates of inflation the
expected rate of inflation is a main determinant of the allocation of
wealth between monetary assets and other types of assets. However,
there is no a-priori reason to argue that changes in ERI affect the
relative demands for currency and deposits in one way or another. The
specific direction implied by the estimates in Table 1 indicates that
banks lose their relative position in financial markets when ERI increases.
This may be due to the lack of adjustment in the returns on deposits
offered by banks.
Bank’s Portfolio Behavior. Our theoretical explanation of this
behavior was based on a distinction between an anticipated and unexpected
component in banks’ lonable capacity. Our hypothesis about the formation
of expectations about loanable capacity and demand deposits was summarized
in expressions (11) and (12). The value of the expectation parameter b
in these expressions was chosen from ordinary least squares regressions
of the supply of loans and the demand for excess
I used was to pick that value of b for which the
LC was entirely allocated to excess reserves and
reserves and the criterion
unexpected component of
the value of the R2
statistic was largest. 1/ This value turns out to be 0.60.-
l_/ Since I considered only one decimal values of b, there was just one
value that satisfied the criterion.-19-
Table 2
Supply of Loans and Demand for Excess Reserves: Two-Stage
Least-Squares Estimates, 1960 I - 1970 IV
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
OPL/P ER/P
ALC/P (endogenous) 1.457** -0.457**
(18.260) (-5.825)
ULC/P (endogenous) 0.174 0.826**
(0.655) (3.086)
ADD/P (endogenous) -0.980** 0.980**
(-5.944) (5.944)
A/DxALC/P (endogenous) -0,431** 0.431**
(-4.229) (4.229)





Substituting identities (9) and (10) into definition (4), loanable
capacity can be written as:
(14) LC = (1-k~-hl)DD+ (1-k2-h2)SD+ (1-k3-h3)TD+ Zb - XLR - XSPL.
The effect on LC of each source differs according to the reserve require-
ments imposed on them. From the estimates in Table 2, a one-peso increase
in each source of LC is allocated between excess reserves and loans in
this way.~1
Changes in: ER OPL
DD 0.372 0.171
SD, TD 0.073 0.675
‘b 0.097 0.903
Thus, the source of the increase in their total liability LC is important
for banks. The large allocation of the increase in demand deposits to
excess reserves is due to the characteristic of this type of bank
liability of being payable on demand and which I assume increases the’
marginal cost of holding loans instead of reserves.
The allocation of anticipated loanable capacity depends upon the
marginal return and cost of holding loans instead of reserves. The main
determinant of this marginal return is the effective loan rate, but no
series is available of it. The ceiling loan rate was used in some
regressions but the signs of the estimates were not as expected.~/
~/ These values were calculated using the estimates of Table 2 and the
mean values in the sample period of the variables A/D and ERI. A
one peso increase in the case of DD means an increase of 0.543 in
LC and in the case of SD and TD an increase of 0.748 in LC as result
of reserve requirements (for the specific values used here see P. 22
fn 1).
~/ For the period 1967 I - 1970 IV, I used a rate charged by other financial
intermediaries as a proxy for the effective loan rate; the estimates had
the expected signs and were significant.-21-
The other two determinants of the marginal return of loans mentioned in
the theoretical specification,Ldr and Ldp$ are approximated by the ratio
of advances to discounts (A/D) and gross domestic product than its (GDP)
respectively. The variable A/D is a measure of the ex-post risk associated
1/ if it appears to banks that the risk of lending with the loan portfolio;-
increases during the period, they will adjust the size of their loan
portfolio to have a larger ratio of advances to discounts at the end of
the quarter. The estimates in Table 2 have the correct signs: increases
in A/D implies increases in the porportion of excess reserves and decreases
in loans. Gross domestic product GDP is used as a measure of loan
demand pressure under the assumption that the level of economic activity
is a main determinant of the demand for short-term debt by businesses.
Increases in GDP are supposed to make banks increase their holdings of
loans as a result of their interest in preserving “customer relationships.”
The estimates in Table 2 are in accordance with this notion.
The main determinant of the marginal cost of holding loans is the
cost of alternative sources of liquidity to excess reserves. The
alternative I consider is the cost of obtaining additional deposits by
offering either higher interest rates on time deposits or additional
benefits on demand and savings deposits. A proxy for the cost of securing
additional deposits is the expected rate of inflation ERI, assuming that
it dominates the behavior of nominal interest rates. The estimates in
Table 2 indicate, as expected, that increases in ERI by increasing the
~/ CF. L.I.M. Vendrell Alda (1967).-22-
cost of securing additional deposits affect banks’ allocation in favor
of a larger participation of excess reserves. The other two determinants
of the marginal cost of holding loans are the anticipated value of demand
deposits ADD and the cost of failing to meet the reserve requirement test
pR. The former is included
the estimates indicate that
demand deposits in loanable
in the specification shown in Table 2 and
the larger the anticipated participation of
capacity, the larger the demand for excess
reserves. The remaining variable pR could not be accurately measured;
in some regressions the penalty rate charged by the Central Bank was used
but the estimates did not have the expected signs.
Iv. DETERMINANT’S OF THE SUPPLY OF MONEY AND BANK CREDIT




summarized in the system of equations presented in Section
decisions of the public and banks refer to the six assets
them. The monetary authority is assumed to control, among
other variables and parameters,
demand and savings deposits and
deposits and ordinary loans are
the interest rates on high-powered money,
selective loans. Interest rates on time
assumed to be set by banks, but the two
equations explaining banks’ behavior
estimated. Thus, the estimations of
equation model in which all interest
monetary authority or inflexible.
with respect to them cannot be
Section 3 are based on a fourteen
rates are either controlled by the
To take into account all the forces which participate in that process,






compute the reduced form coefficients from the 2SLS
average reserve requirements coefficients that appear in
for legal reserves and selective loans must take specific
appropriate series of these average reserve requirements
- 1968 I are hardly available because of the difference
between marginal and average requirements before WY 1968, the com-
putations shown in this section are based upon the values for the subperiod
.,
1968 II - 1970 111.~j In Table 3 I present estimates of the quarterly
impact, total interim and equilibrium multipliers of the exogenous
variables on the supply of money and bank credit derived from the
reduced and final forms of the model.?’
From an initial equilibrium position, a change in any one of the
exogenous variables affecting the allocation of M2 between currency and
deposits will initiate a process in which all of the endogenous variables
will move to a new equilibrium position. In the short-run such a change
~1 The values of the reserve requirement parameters used to compute the
reduced and final forms are the following:
kl + (1-f)hl = 0.157 + (0.25x0.30)= 0.232
f“hl = 0.225
k2 + (1-f)h2 = k3 + (1-f)h3 = 0.074+ (0.25x0.178)= 0.118
f0h2= f0h3 = 0.75x0.178 = 0.134
All these values correspond to the period 1968 11 - 1970 111.
~/ The multipliers corresponding to the variables DDV, IT, ERI, A/D
and IS were computed using the average values of PY and ALC/P in
















































will affect banks’ loanable capacity and its allocation between loans
and reserves, The change in loans will in turn affect the quantity out-
standing of M2 and its allocation between currency and deposits. The
short-run position will depend upon the adjustment mechanism of actual
to desired quantities of currency and deposits by the public, and upon
the effect of current loanable capacity on its anticipated component.
These two factors introduce nonstationary features into the model,
because they imply movements toward a long-run equilibrium position.
A similar process will occur if there is a change in any of the exogenous
variables affecting the allocation of loanable capacity between reserves
and loans.
Depending upon their effect on the supply of money and ordinary
loans, the exogenous variables can be divided into two groups: those
that initially affect the balance-sheet constraint of a sector and those
that initially affect the allocation of these aggregates among alternative
assets. In general, the former have a greater effect on the supply of
money and ordinary loans than does the latter. The reason is that those
variables which initially affect only the allocation of assets in the
system lead to partially offsetting effects. The five nonpolicy exogenous
variables (DDV, ~, ERI, GDP and A/D) and the first policy variable (Is)
initiallyhave onl’yan allocative effect while the remaining policy
variables (Zb, Zpy XLR and XSPL)A’ result initially in changes in the
balance-sheet constraints.
Al I consider the variables Zb, Zp, and XLR as controlled by the govern-
ment. However, these variables include, among other assets and debts,
other assets traded between the public and banks that are not
explicitly treated in the model.-26-
A more appropriate measure of the size of the effects of the
exogenous variables is the elasticity of money and loans with respect
to each of them. As shown in Table 4, the elasticities of the first six
exogenous variables are close to zero. Only the elasticity of the supply
of rnon~yM1/P with respect to GDP (equal to 0.14) has a relatively large
value. This is due to the role which GDP plays in the allocation of M2 --
an increase in GDP increases currency and demand deposits and decreases
savings and time deposits -- and to its role in the allocation of loanable
capacity -- an increase in GDP similarly increases the supply of loans and
decreases the demand for excess reserves. The lower values of the
elasticities of M2/P and OPL/P with respect to GDP are due to the inverse
effect on savings and time deposits, which partially offsets the effects
on currency, demand deposits and loans. There is no other variable
affecting the allocation of M2 and LC (see Tables 1 and 2) for which the
effects on the components of Ml and M2 and on OPL do not tend to offset
each other. For example, in the case of 1S, its impact effects on Ml,
M2 and OPL are the result of the offsetting effects on currency and
deposits. However, in the long-run, when the substitution effect between
savings deposits and currency is large, the effects of IS are rather
important; even after one year, the effects on the stock of money M2
and bank credit are important (see Table 3).
The multipliers of Table 3 reveal a significant difference between
the two policies variables Zp and Zb. Changes in the supply of high-
powered money will affect the supply of money and bank credit through-27-
Table 4
Supply of Money and Bank Credit: Short- and Long-Run
Elasticities with Respect to Exogenous Variables
Exogenous Short-run Long-run



































changes in Zp andfor Zb. These variables express the effect of high-
powered money in the liability side of each sector’s balance-sheet,
whereas currency and reserves express the effect on the asset side.
Although initial effects on the money supply are virtually the same for
both Zp and Zb, a change in Zp result in a much
credit than a change in Zb. In the equilibrium
also important differences: a change in Zb has
smaller effect on bank
multipliers there are
a greater effect than a
change in Z . These differences reflect different behavior on the part
P
of the two sectors. For the public it makes no difference if the initial
change in the total liability M2 is due to Zp, to OPL, or to SPL, whereas
banks’ response to this change will differ according to
change. If, for example, the change in banks’ loanable





will be a larger effect on OPL than if the change came
1/ since the latter are subject to reserve requirements.-
if the change comes from demand deposits, the effect on
OPL will be even lower because of the larger liquidity needs of this
type of deposits. The elasticities with respectto Zp and Zb have large
values in all the three cases, except for the contribution of Zp in the
explanation of loans. Elasticities of the supply of money and bank
credit with respect to high-powered money can be obtained from Table 4
by adding the corresponding elasticities with respect to Zp and Zb;
they are below one in the short-run and well above one in the long-run.~1
l_/ See p. 19.
~/ In the traditional multiplier
the elasticities of the money
are maintained to be equal to
hypothesis.
approach to the study of the money supply,
supply with respect to high-powered money
one. Our results contradict this-29-
The policy variable XLR is a component of loanable capacity (see
equation (14)) like Zb; therefore> the estimates of the multiplier in
Table 3 are of equal absolute value but of different signs. The low
elasticity of this variable is due to its small participation in banks’
loanablecapacity. The policy variable XSPL initially affects the two
balance-sheet constraints and in opposite directions; therefore, the
estimates of the multipliers in Table 3 differ from those of XLR in
absolute values. There is also a different sign for money than for loans
in the impact multipliers. The positive effect on money is due to its
effect on the public’s balance-sheet constraint, whereas the negative
effect on loans is due to its effect on banks’ loanable capacity.
Again the low elasticity of XSPL is due to its small participation in
both balance-sheet constraints.
The role of both the “complete” partial adjustment mechanism of
the public’s portfolio behavior and of the hypothesis on banks’ expectations
about loanable capacity and demand deposits can be analyzed by comparing
the size of the impact and equilibrium multipliers. In general, as shown
in Table 3, the equilibrium multipliers are substantially larger in
absolute value than impact multipliers. However, the large equilibrium
multipliers of nonpolicy variables do not imply important increases in
the absolute values of the elasticities (see Table 4); they continue
being close to zero except for gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore,
the proportion of the total effects of nonpolicy variables that takes
place within a year is less than 50 per cent (see Table 3), except for
our loan risk measure A/D. In the case of policy variables, the absolute-30-
values of the long-run elasticities are generally quite different from
zero and most of the total effects takes place within a year.
Having analyzed each explanatory variable separately, I consider
the question of how well the model does at tracking the behavior of the
stocks of money and bank credit. To assess this tracking ability I
compute the predicted values of Ml/P, M2/P and OPL/P from the estimated
reduced form equations and perform a dynamic simulation for the period
1968 11 - 1970 111.~/ In Table 5 I present the series of actual, predicted
and simulated values of Ml/P, M2/P and OPL/P.
The predicted values approximatereasonablywell the behavior of
the actual values. In particular, all the turning points of the series
of actual values are accurately forecasted, except fox the turning point
of M2/P in the second quarter of 1970 that is missed by a quarter. The
series of simulated values show no error accumulation, which is important
for multiperiod forecasting, and the turning points coincide with those
of the series of predicted values.
In summary, empirical evidence indicates that in the short-run the
supply of money and bank credit do not respond significantly to variables
related to the returns of assets traded between banks and the public.
The short-run behavior of the money stock and bank credit is determined
largely by the behavior of high-powered money and its composition in terms
~1 The predicted values are computed by using the actual observed values
of all exogenous and lagged endogenous variables for each quarter.
The simulated values are computed from actual observed values of all
exogenous and lagged endogenous variables for 1968 11 and proceeding
then forward in time, quarter after quarter, using as inputs for each
successive quarter’s calculations the actual observed values for




































































































1/ bY the ~ublicts portfolio disequilibrium, of the variables Zp and Zb>-
and by banks’ expectations about the behavior of loanable capacity and
demand deposits. A model based on this explanation of the supply of
money and bank credit appears to do well at tracking the quarterly
behavior of these variables.
~/ Even for given values of the supply of high-powered money, the
monetary authority can produce important effects on the supply






















Currency held by the public, in billions of pesos at 1960
prices, measured as average of stocks for the last day of
the second and third months of the quarter;
Demand deposits held by the public, measured as C/P;
Savings deposits held by the public, measured as C/P;
Time deposits held by the public, measured as C/P;
Sum of currency and demand, savings and time deposits;
Ordinary loans held by banks, in billions of pesos at 1960
prices, measured as an average for the last month of each
quarter;
Excess reserves held by banks, measured as OPL/P;
Ordinary loans plus excess reserves;
Anticipated loanable capacity, measured as OPL/P;
Unexpected loanable capacity, derived as the difference
between current and anticipated loanable capacity;
Anticipated demand deposits, measured as DD/P;
Permanent income, in billions of pesos at 1960 prices;
Gross domestic product, in billions of pesos at 1960 prices;
Quarterly expected rate of inflation;
Annual rate paid by banks on savings deposits (equal to the
Central Bank’s ceiling rate), measured as average of rates
for the last day of the second and third months of the quarter;
Annual rate paid by banks on 3-months time deposits (equal to
the Banco de la Nation’s rate), measured as 1s;
Demand deposits’ turnover rate, as measured in the last month
of the quarter;
Banks’ ratio of advances to discounts, measured at the end of
the quarter.-34-
Sources:
Data on high-powered money, deposits and loans: From Banco Central de
de la Republics Argentina, Boletin Estadistico, several
issues and unpublished data.
Data on demand deposits’ turnover rate and banks’ ratio of advances to
discounts: From Banco Central de la Republics Argentina,
Boletin Estadistico, several issues.
Data on interest rate on savings deposits: From Banco Central de la
Republics Argentina, letters to commercial banks.
Data on interest rate on time deposits: From Banco de la Nation,
unpublished data.
Data on quarterly gross domestic product: From Pou, Pedro, The Demand
for Money and the Balance of Payments: Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago, 1972.
Data on prices: From Insti@to National de Estadisticas y Censos,
Boletin Estadistico, several issues.
Data on anticipated loanable capacity, anticipated demand deposits,
permanent income and expected rate of inflation:
From Barandiaran (1973).-35-
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